Monthly Archives: December 2017

Emergency Management is a Local Responsibility

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During recent testimony, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator Brock Long told Congress that state and local communities must do a better job of preparing for disaster response and must stop looking to FEMA as a first responder.

Since FEMA was created in 1979, the agency has consistently described its role as a coordinating agency, bringing together all federal agencies in support of state and local governments, who are responsible for disaster and emergency response. The National Response Framework, issued by FEMA in 2008 and updated in 2013, describes a tiered system for disaster response, in which the primary responsibility for response and recovery operations is vested in municipal or county governments.  When local resources are insufficient, assistance is provided by neighboring jurisdictions through mutual aid, or by the state. When state resources are insufficient, state officials can request assistance from FEMA.

Emergency managers understand this.  But over time, as FEMA has become heavily involved in high-profile disasters, the public – and many non-emergency management local officials – have begun to view disaster response as a federal responsibility.

So, Mr. Long is certainly correct in pointing out to lawmakers that FEMA is neither structured, resourced, prepared, nor equipped to serve as a first responder during disasters or large-scale emergencies.

Most local officials do understand their critical role, but many find it difficult to devote resources to preparation for worst-case scenarios that likely will never occur.  Most local safety forces are already stretched thin just handling the day-to-day calls for service that they receive.  There is little time for disaster response training and little funding for specialized disaster relief equipment.  One result is that federal grant funding, which increased significantly after the 9/11 attacks, has become the main source of emergency management funding for many local emergency management agencies.

In an era of increasing federal deficits, this is an unsustainable practice. While Emergency Management Performance Grant funding has remained steady, funding for the Homeland Security Grant Program has declined form $861 million in 2009 to $402 million in 2017.

And Administrator Long is correct, state and local emergency management agencies will need to live with reduced funding or identify local sources.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-fema/fema-chief-questions-agencys-role-urges-more-local-response-idUSKBN1DU2KT

http://www.govtech.com/em/emergency-blogs/managing-crisis/Who-Should-Pay-for-070113.html

December 16, 2017

Remember Pearl Harbor

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The re-floated battleship, USS Nevada, enters Drydock #2 at the Navy Yard.

The submerged remains of the USS Arizona and the twisted wreckage of the USS Utah are visible to Pearl Harbor visitors today.  But while it is still possible to detect evidence of the ferocious attack, few signs remain of the desperate efforts of ship crews, shipyard workers, and other military and civilian personnel to rescue survivors, control shipboard damage, and kick start the long process of recovery and salvage.

2335 U.S. military personnel were killed in the attack, including 1177 members of the Arizona’s crew.  An additional 68 civilians died in the strike by Japanese naval warplanes. Twenty-one U.S. ships were sunk or damaged, including all eight of the Pacific Fleet battleships that were there. Five U.S. battleships were sunk, yet three of the sunken battleships were raised and returned to service during the war following a massive salvage effort that was greatly aided by the Japanese failure to attack the Yard’s drydocks, cranes, and shops.

Salvage operations began before some shipboard fires were fully extinguished. While damage control teams continued to search for survivors, fight fires, stop flooding, and shore up damaged compartments, Navy Yard workers, ship crews and repair teams from tenders began repair and salvage work. Within a week the Navy Yard created a Salvage Division to oversee the massive effort. In the next two years Navy and civilian divers would conduct more than 5,000 dives, totaling more than 20,000 hours, much of it in the pitch-black interiors of sunken ships, where divers recovered bodies, ammunition, documents, and other critical items.

Once the sunken ships were re-floated, teams of sailors could enter and clean the oil and mud-caked spaces.  But the work was grisly and dangerous, and much had to be done wearing gas masks.  No other protective gear was provided, other than coveralls and rubber boots, and even those were only supplied for work in the foulest compartments. The dewatered spaces were a filthy tangle of sodden clothing and bedding, dissolving paper, rotting food, and smashed equipment. When debris and excess equipment were removed and the ships were cleaned of oil and mud, permanent repairs could be made at the Navy Yard or in shipyards on the U.S. west coast.

Shortages of personnel, materials, tools, supplies, and critical equipment – including pumps – slowed the salvage work at Pearl, but eventually six sunken ships, including three battleships, were raised and repaired in time to rejoin the fight against Japan.

U.S. Navy photo: https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/post-attack-ship-salvage/salvage-work-on-uss-nevada–december-1941—april-1942.html

Casualty figures from Pearl Harbor Visitor’s Center website: https://visitpearlharbor.org/faqs/how-many-people-died-at-pearl-harbor-during-the-attack/

For a full accounting of the Pearl Harbor salvage operation, see Resurrection: Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor, by Daniel Madsen, Naval Institute Press, 2003.

December 7, 2017