It was no chance encounter.

When the Confederate warship CSS Alabama glided out of the French port of Cherbourg, her Captain, Rafael Semmes, and her crew knew that the USS Kearsarge was waiting just offshore.

It was Sunday, June 19, 1864. The U.S. Navy had been chasing Alabama since her commissioning 22 months earlier. During that time Alabama had destroyed 65 U.S. merchant vessels and one U.S. Navy warship in a cruise that had taken her from Great Britain, where she was built, to the U.S. east coast, the Gulf of Mexico, across the South Atlantic, through the Indian Ocean, into the South Pacific, and now back to the English Channel.

Kearsarge – like Alabama, a modern steam-powered sloop-of-war – was one of dozens of U.S. Navy ships searching for Alabama and the handful of Confederate cruisers that were preying on U.S. merchant ships around the world. U.S. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells was using his most capable ships in the effort, and he had created a rudimentary global surveillance network to support them. For the crew of the Kearsarge, this was the payoff for more than two years of searching the Atlantic for Confederate warships. For the crew of Alabama, the Confederacy’s most successful raider, it was their last chance to escape before additional U.S. Navy ships could arrive.

Ironclads, Blockade Runners, and Commerce Raiders

The globe-spanning voyage of the Alabama and her approaching contest with Kearsarge were the predictable result of the Confederacy’s decision to wage war afloat while avoiding direct confrontations with the U.S. Navy.

With no navy of their own at the start of the war, and no chance to build one that could match the U.S. Navy, Confederate leaders adopted an asymmetric naval strategy that they hoped could contribute to victory despite the U.S. Navy’s commanding advantages in ships, sailors, and industrial capacity.

Confederate strategy aimed to protect Confederate ports and river commerce with forts, gunboats, and ironclad ships; to break the U.S. naval blockade by using specially-fitted vessels; and to conduct world-wide attacks against U.S. merchant shipping by a mix of privateers and government-owned commerce raiders.

Confederate leaders hoped that continued river traffic and blockade running could maintain the critical flow of arms, munitions, and other supplies from foreign sources while commerce raiding would weaken the blockade by forcing the U.S. Navy to send warships in search of Confederate raiders. Additionally, they hoped that the destruction of U.S. merchant ships would damage the U.S. economy and strengthen anti-war sentiment in Northern states.

But though the Confederacy’s naval strategy enjoyed some early successes, by 1864 the U.S. Navy’s counter-strategy had overcome Confederate efforts. The U.S. Navy had gained control of key waterways, including the Mississippi River; the blockade had grown tighter as more U.S. Navy ships were employed and their tactics improved; U.S. armies had captured additional Confederate ports; and commerce raiding had not significantly harmed the U.S. war effort.

Confederate commerce raiding did slash the number of merchant ships operating under the U.S. flag, as the threat of attack caused insurance rates to spike, leading many U.S. ship owners to sell their vessels to foreign operators.  But though the damage to the U.S. commercial shipping industry was serious and long-lasting – the number of U.S.-flagged merchant ships declined from about 5,000 in 1861 to around 2,500 in 1865 and did not recover until World War I – the great majority of the “lost” ships were merely reflagged and continued to operate as before, though under foreign rather than American ownership. While Confederate cruisers destroyed more than 200 U.S. merchant ships during the war and caused the reflagging of thousands, U.S. foreign trade actually increased.

None of that was clear to U.S. officials in the first months of the war, however, and as Confederate commerce raiders began sinking U.S. merchant ships in 1861, fear gripped U.S. ship owners and importers/exporters. Their complaints prompted Secretary Welles to develop a plan for countering Confederate commerce raiding.

An Act of Folly

A career political journalist from Connecticut, Welles was appointed Secretary of the Navy in recognition of his New England roots and his steadfast support of Abraham Lincoln during the 1860 presidential campaign. His naval experience was limited to two years as the civilian head of the Navy Department’s Bureau of Provisions and Clothing during the Mexican-American War.

Yet Wells proved to be a resourceful and effective strategist and administrator, and with the capable aid of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavius Fox, he oversaw the growth of the U.S. Navy from 76 ships and 7,600 sailors in 1861 to nearly 700 ships and more than 51,000 sailors in 1864.

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles  Photo: US Library of Congress

Operationally, the joint efforts of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army gained control of western rivers and seized or blockaded most Confederate ports, strangling Confederate commerce. Though he had initially opposed the plan to blockade the Confederacy as a violation of international law and as a task far beyond the capability of the pre-war U.S. Navy, Welles succeeded in creating an effective barrier that reduced Confederate cotton trade to 5 percent of its pre-war levels.

As for commerce raiding, Welles recognized that the Confederacy could muster few ships for that purpose. At no time did the Confederacy have more than eight cruisers at sea, and the damage they could inflict on the U.S. war effort was certain to be limited. Taking U.S. Navy ships away from blockade duty – which was the core of U.S. naval strategy – would be “an act of folly,” he said. It made no sense “to detach vessels from the blockade and send them off scouring the ocean for this roving wolf, which has no country, no home, no resting-place.”

Yet Welles could not ignore the growing political pressure, so he did what he could. Limited by logistical, technological, manpower, and diplomatic constraints, he took a number of forceful steps to limit the impact of commerce-raiding.

Global Surveillance

Welle’s primary problem was that the U.S. Navy he was building was designed for the nation’s strategic priorities: amphibious operations and coastal blockade. Only a handful of the hundreds of new ships acquired or constructed by the Navy during the war were suitable for open ocean operations. In addition, the intelligence-gathering and communications capabilities of the Navy were woefully inadequate for locating, tracking, and intercepting individual raiders. Information on the activities of Confederate ships was frequently inaccurate, and virtually always was obtained many days too late.

Welles had sixteen modern ships that were technologically capable of catching and defeating Confederate raiders and he used them nearly exclusively in that role. These ships – including Kearsarge – were propeller-driven steam sloops – nearly identical to the most capable Confederate raiders, the British-built steamships Alabama, Florida, and Shenandoah.  Constructed between 1858 and 1862, the U.S. ships were designed for ocean cruising, were heavily armed, and could reach speeds of 10 to 12 knots. Welles kept these powerful ships at sea as much as possible in a relentless effort to destroy Confederate cruisers.

To support his ships’ operations Welles established coaling depots in overseas ports and deployed ships to various locations around the world. He also directed that merchant ships carrying certain high-value cargo sail in convoys protected by naval vessels.

Welles also established a rudimentary global surveillance network, that would, he hoped, provide critical information on the activities of Confederate warships. In creating the network, Welles relied heavily on the hundreds of U.S. consulate offices that were already located in foreign cities, including most major ports.

Consular officers provided a steady stream of intelligence about Confederate ship construction, sailing schedules, and industries targeted by the cruisers as well as sketches and descriptions of the commerce raiders. Some agents even managed to provide photographs of Confederate ships. Consuls gathered information from many sources, paid and unpaid, including port workers, host government officials, deserters from Confederate cruisers, seamen who had been captured by Confederate ships and released, and shipping agents. They also intercepted or purchased stolen letters and papers being sent by Confederate officers.

This information was sent to Washington where it helped the Navy Department understand how Confederate cruisers operated and provided clues that could help U.S. ships anticipate Confederate operations. Welles relied on this intelligence when he drafted sailing orders for navy ships. But the lack of rapid communication meant that even when U.S. agents knew that a Confederate ship had entered a foreign port, there was no way to quickly alert the Navy Department or for the Navy Department to quickly notify a nearby ship.

Alabama is Found

But not all information passed through Washington. U.S. Navy captains gathered their own information about recent sightings of Confederate cruisers and consular officials could contact U.S. ships directly with information when U.S. ships were in port.

Which is exactly how Kearsarge found Alabama.

When Alabama entered Cherbourg on June 11, Kearsarge was less than 400 miles away at the Netherlands port of Vlissingen. U.S. agents quickly advised Kearsarge of the Confederate cruiser’s arrival, and the U.S. ship arrived at Cherbourg on June 14.

Upon arrival, Kearsarge entered the port where her commanding officer, Captain John A. Winslow, attempted to take on the prisoners from captured ships that had been released ashore by Alabama. But Alabama’s Semmes protested to French authorities, arguing that bringing aboard the prisoners would augment Kearsarge’s crew to the detriment of Alabama and would violate French neutrality. French authorities agreed and would not allow the transfer. Rebuffed by French neutrality, Winslow sailed Kearsarge out of the port, taking station in the open waters off the harbor mouth where he would wait for Alabama.

A Calculated Risk

Semmes now faced a hard choice.

His ship badly needed repairs. Her executive officer John Mcintosh Kell later wrote, “Her boilers were burned out, and her machinery was sadly in want of repairs. She was loose at every joint, her seams were open, and the copper on her bottom was in rolls.”

But the French so far had denied Alabama permission to enter the government-owned shipyards while officials waited for approval from the emperor, who was away from Paris.

Entering Cherbourg had been a calculated risk for Semmes. His ship needed work but he knew that U.S. agents would quickly report his arrival. If a warship had to be dispatched from the American east coast, he might have three weeks or more to effect repairs and escape. But if a U.S. Navy ship were nearby – as Kearsarge was, though Semmes did not know it – they might arrive before Alabama could be repaired.

The arrival of Kearsarge before Alabama had even entered the shipyard must have surprised Semmes, but it didn’t necessarily portend disaster. This was the sixth time Semmes had been confronted by a U.S. Navy warship.

In July 1861, while in command of CSS Sumter, the Confederacy’s first commerce raider, Semmes had broken through the U.S. Navy blockade and escaped to sea by outrunning the sloop-of-war USS Brooklyn.

Four months later, while coaling at Martinique, he was blockaded by the sloop-of-war USS Iroquois. Again, he was able to escape, this time by slipping out of port during the night.

In January 1862 Semmes took Sumter across the Atlantic, but the ship was damaged during the stormy crossing and was forced to seek repair services at British-controlled Gibraltar. But the British refused permission for major repairs or even refueling, and soon enough a succession of U.S. Navy warships – including Kearsarge – arrived and took station nearby, waiting for Sumter to emerge. Trapped and unable to repair or refuel his vessel, Semmes and his officers abandoned Sumter and made their way to Britain, where they took positions on the Alabama, then under construction in a Liverpool yard.

In June 1862, now in command of Alabama, Semmes was again caught at Martinique, this time by the veteran steam frigate USS San Jacinto. But Semmes slipped away through the rain and easily escaped the ponderous San Jacinto, which he derisively described as “this old wagon of a ship.”

In January 1863, while operating off Galveston, Alabama fought and sank a U.S. Navy blockading vessel, the converted ferry USS Hatteras. In the dark, when hailed by Hatteras, Semmes identified his ship as a British vessel before delivering a surprise broadside at point-blank range. Hatteras returned fire, but was quickly overwhelmed and sunk.

So, Semmes had reason to think that he might again escape. He could try to slip past Kearsarge in the dark or during bad weather, as he had done at Martinique. He could try to fight his way past Kearsarge before other U.S. warships arrived, as he had done at Galveston. Or he could abandon Alabama and escape with his officers, as he had done at Gibraltar.

Abandoning Alabama now would mean the loss of the ship and the disbandment of the crew, two serious blows to the Confederacy, which was already reeling. By June of 1864 the pivotal U.S. victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg were nearly a year in the past. General U.S. Grant’s Army of the Potomac had driven Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia into the trenches surrounding Petersburg, where they would fight a ghastly battle of attrition for the next nine months. And General William T. Sherman’s western armies had invaded Georgia and were threatening Atlanta. Foreign recognition of the Confederacy was not going to happen and U.S. anti-war sentiment, though still strong, was ebbing as U.S. victories accumulated.

Semmes believed that Alabama, even in her weakened condition, was the equal of Kearsarge, and though his basic orders were to avoid combat with U.S. Navy ships that were his equal, he was loath to allow his ship to be lost without a fight. During her career, Alabama had not been seriously challenged, and Semmes had confidence in his crew and ship.

So, Semmes decided to fight. He sent a note to his agent in Cherbourg stating, “My intention is to fight the Kearsarge as soon as I can make the necessary arrangements. I hope these will not detain me more than until to-morrow or the morrow morning at farthest. I beg she will not depart until I am ready to go out.”

He needn’t have worried. Kearsarge wasn’t going anywhere. Before leaving Vlissingen, Winslow had telegraphed Gibraltar to send the USS St. Louis to assist.

Built for War

Semmes had good reason to be confident in his mostly-British crew. But Kearsarge was no under-armed ferryboat like Hatteras. She could match Alabama’s speed and maneuverability, and her armament was equal to Alabama’s. She was in better material condition, and her crew was well-trained.

In Kell’s words, Kearsarge “was built for a vessel of war, and we for speed, and though she carried one gun less, her battery was more effective at point-blank range.  While Alabama carried one more gun, Kearsarge threw more metal at a broadside and while our heavy guns were more effective at long range, her 11-inch guns gave her greatly the advantage at close range. She also had a slight advantage in her crew, she carrying 163, all told, while we carried 149.”

And Kearsarge had two additional advantages that that would shape the outcome of the coming fight. Unknown to Semmes and Kell, Kearsarge’s sides had been draped with chains, providing an effective, if unconventional, type of armor. Winslow’s crew had covered the chains with wooden planks, so the armor was hidden from view and was not detected by Semmes or his crew even when Kearsarge had entered the port at Cherbourg.

Kearsarge’s hull armor had been installed more than a year earlier, and it was intended to protect the ship’s engine and boilers when the ship’s coal bunkers were not filled. In contemporary accounts of the battle, Semmes explained that had he known of Kearsarge’s armoring, he would not have fought the U.S. ship.

Kearsarge’s second advantage was in the reliability of her ammunition.

Without access to Confederate ports, Alabama had no easy way to replenish or refresh its ammunition supply. Much of her powder was more than two years old, and all of her powder had been exposed to heat and water and was degraded.

Semmes was aware of problems with his powder and munitions. Gunnery drills conducted in the months before his battle with Kearsarge had revealed problems with the fuses on his shells and with the reliability of his powder. The problems were serious enough that Alabama’s crew dumped seven barrels of damp powder overboard the night before their fight with Kearsarge.

But there was nothing Semmes could do to correct these problems before the battle.

One Hour and Ten Minutes

Between 9:00 and 10:00 am, Alabama weighed anchor and began gliding slowly towards the harbor mouth. As Alabama exited the harbor, Kearsarge headed offshore, slowly building speed, to ensure that the battle would take place in international waters. After 45 minutes, now seven miles offshore, Kearsarge turned towards Alabama, and the two ships rapidly closed the distance between each other. Alabama – whose largest guns were more effective at long range, fired first, but she scored no hits.

As the two ships approached each other on opposite courses, Kearsarge sheared to port so that the ships would pass each other starboard to starboard. As the ships came abreast of each other, at a range of about a mile, both began firing broadsides. As they passed, Winslow turned to starboard to swing behind Alabama and rake her – a highly effective tactic in those days. Semmes countered by also turning to starboard, which resulted in the ships tracing circles in the sea while they pounded each other with their starboard batteries for the next hour.

The two ships were similarly armed. Each carried two large-caliber guns mounted on the centerline of the main deck. These pivot guns moved on metal rails on the deck and could be trained to either side. Kearsarge’s guns were both 11-inchers while Alabama carried two 8-inch guns.

In addition, each ship carried a small number of smaller guns mounted on traditional carriages and which were fired through gunports on the side of the ship. Kearsarge carried four 32-pound guns – 32 pounds being the weight of the projectile being fired – while Alabama carried six slightly heavier 32-pounders. Kearsarge also carried one 30-pounder rifle, for a total of seven guns against Alabama’s eight guns.

During the fight, Alabama’s gunners fired more rapidly – they managed more than 370 shots at Kearsarge, while the U.S. gunners fired more deliberately, getting off only about 177 shots. But Kearsarge’s gunners were more accurate, repeatedly hitting Alabama’s hull, while Alabama’s shots struck Kearsarge’s hull just 13 or 14 times, according to Winslow.

Kearsarge’s slower rate of fire was a result of Winslow’s instructions for his crews to “make sure of your aim.”  The disciplined and well-trained gun crews fired only when they had a target, waiting patiently for smoke to clear from previous shots before aiming and firing again. Winslow had also directed that his smaller guns be used to clear Alabama’s decks, while Kearsarge’s 11-inch guns were to concentrate their fire on Alabama’s hull below the waterline. Alabama’s gunfire, in contrast was “rapid and wild,” according to Winslow, with most shots tearing through Kearsarge’s rigging, and doing little damage to the ship or crew. Kearsarge suffered no fatalities during the fight, though one of the three sailors who were seriously wounded died later of his injuries.

Early in the battle, Semmes had seen that Alabama’s shells were striking Kearsarge, but were failing to explode. He directed his gunners to switch to solid shot, and for the rest of the fight they alternated between shot and shell. It made no difference.

As the ships circled each other blasting away, the circles gradually became tighter, shortening the distance between the ships. By the eighth circle, Alabama and Kearsarge were only 400 yards apart. By then, wrote Winslow, the Confederate cruiser’s “firing became better.”

A Sinking Condition

But it was already too late for Alabama. The carefully aimed fire of Kearsarge had torn great holes in Alabama’s hull, half of Alabama’s main battery had been disabled, her rudder had been damaged, and her engine was inoperable. She was, wrote Semmes, “in a sinking condition.” Dead and wounded men were scattered across Alabama’s decks. One of her pivot guns had been struck and eighteen members of the gun’s crew had been killed or wounded. On the ship’s seventh circling, a Kearsarge shell had penetrated Alabama’s hull and exploded in a coal bunker, extinguishing the fires in her boilers and disabling her engine.

Under sail, with water pouring in, Alabama veered away and attempted to run for the coast of France. But Semmes quickly realized that Alabama would never make it and he ordered his flag struck.

Semmes later complained that Kearsarge continued to fire on the sinking Alabama after her flag had been pulled down, though Winslow wrote in his report that Alabama fired at least two broadsides at Kearsarge after hauling down her own flag. In the confusion, smoke, and noise of nineteenth century naval combat, flags were often shot away and gun crews – consumed with their task and unable to hear commands from the quarterdeck – were sometime slow to respond to orders to stop, so it would not be surprising if both captains were correct.

Semmes and Winslow both reported that as Alabama turned towards shore, she left herself vulnerable to devastating raking fire from Kearsarge. Winslow, however, saw a white flag being hoisted on Alabama and ordered his crew to hold their fire.

Semmes also complained that Kearsarge was slow to send boats to rescue Alabama’s crew, who were abandoning their sinking ship. He also implied that there was something unsporting in Kearsarge’s hidden chain armor, though he never disputed Winslow’s right to protect his ship.

As Alabama sank stern first, Kearsarge sent boats to rescue Alabama’s crew. But a British yacht, the Deerhound, which had followed Alabama to the scene of battle and had been asked by Winslow to assist in rescue operations, picked up 41 members of Alabama’s crew, including Semmes, and fled to England, saving Semmes and many of his men from capture as prisoners of war. Though no one knows for certain how many men were aboard Alabama when she left Cherbourg, a detailed review of various reports and muster documents by Marshall University identified 145 men aboard the Alabama, of whom eight were killed in action, 21 were missing and presumed drowned, 66 were captured by Kearsarge, 41 escaped on Deerhound, and nine were rescued by other vessels.

An Admiral and a General

Winslow remained in command of Kearsarge until February 1865 when he was assigned to supervise construction of ironclad warships. He later commanded the Portsmouth Navy Yard, was promoted to rear admiral, and commanded the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Station. He died in 1873 at the age of 62.

Semmes remained in Europe for several months before returning to the Confederate States. In February 1865 he assumed command of the Confederacy’s James River Fleet. When Richmond fell, he ordered his ships burned and escaped to Danville, VA, where he became a brigadier general and converted his former sailors into an artillery brigade. When the Confederacy surrendered, he was pardoned, arrested, imprisoned, and pardoned again. He died in 1877 at the age of 68.

The USS Kearsarge was decommissioned in 1866, but returned to active service in 1868. After two years of service in the Pacific, she was decommissioned again in 1870, but was placed back in commission from 1873-1878. She continued alternating periods of commissioned service with decommissioned periods until 1894, when she was wrecked on a reef in the Caribbean Sea.

August 5, 2021

A version of the article was posted on the Military History Now website: https://militaryhistorynow.com/2021/08/03/the-battle-of-cherbourg-when-union-and-confederate-warships-clashed-off-the-coast-of-france/

Sources:

American Battlefield Trust website; Ten Facts: Civil War Navies; https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/10-facts-civil-war-navies Retrieved 2.9.2021.

Dickinson, Jack L.; C.S.S. Alabama: An Illustrated History; Marshall Digital Scholar; Fall 10-11-2017;  https://mds.marshall.edu/css_al/  Retrieved 6.14.2021.

Dudley, William S.; CSS Alabama: Lost and Found; Naval History and Heritage Command website; Published: Wed May 13 09:50:03 EDT 2020; https://www.history.navy.mil/research/underwater-archaeology/sites-and-projects/ship-wrecksites/css-alabama/css-alabama-lost-and-found.html; Retrieved 7.15.2021.

Foster, Kevin; The Diplomats Who Sank a Fleet: The Confederacy’s Undelivered European Fleet and the Union Consular Service; Prologue Magazine; Fall 2001, Vol. 33, No.3; National Archives website; https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2001/fall/confederate-fleet-1.html           Retrieved 6.23.2021.

Kell, John McIntosh; Cruise and Combats of the “Alabama” Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. IV; American Battlefields Trust website: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/primary-sources/cruise-and-combats-alabama ; Retrieved 2.19.2021.

Marvel, William; CSS Alabama; Encyclopedia of Alabama website, Published  February 2, 2007 | Last updated:  November 14, 2016; http://encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-973 ; Retrieved 6.23.2021 ; Retrieved 6.23.2021.

Prickett, Jeffrey W. LCDR USN; The Leadership of John A. Winslow and Raphael Semmes: A Comparative Case Study; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Fort Leavenworth, KS; 2018; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1084518.pdf     Retrieved 6.15.2021.

Ringle, Dennis J.; Life in Mr. Lincoln’s Navy; Naval Institute Press; Annapolis, MD; 1998.

Rupert, Joseph Murray, CDR, SC, USN: Hurry All To Sea: Union Naval Strategy To Counter Confederate Commerce Raiding; U.S. Naval War College; Newport, RI; June 1992; https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a268096.pdfRetrieved 4.17.2021

Symonds, Craig; Kearsarge and Alabama, The Civil War’s Classic Ship-to-Ship Duel; American Battlefields Trust website: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/kearsarge-and-alabama ; Retrieved 2.19.2021.

Welles, Gideon; Annual Report of the Navy Department: Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1864; Government Printing Office; Internet Archive Website; posted 2.21.2009; https://archive.org/details/annualreportsna13deptgoog/page/n738/mode/2up?q=Kearsage Retrieved 2.20.2021.

Winslow, John A. and Semmes, Raphael; Sinking of C.S.S. Alabama by U.S.S. Kearsarge, 19 June 1864; Naval History and Heritage Command website; Published: Tue Oct 31 12:09:39 EDT 2017; https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/s/sinking-of-css-alabama-by-uss-kearsarge-19-jun-1864.html; Retrieved 7.15.2021.