As Chinese economic, diplomatic, and military power grows, and China becomes ever more assertive in pursuing its interests in Asia, the United States must inevitably adjust to the changing strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region.

The ability of China and the United States to jointly manage the evolution of the strategic landscape will determine if war or peace prevail. But our ability to manage conflict is limited by our incomplete understanding of Chinese history, culture, political philosophy, and national power.

Here are seven things to keep in mind when trying to assess the threat that China might pose to the United States:

1. For most of its history, China was the most technologically advanced and modern society on the planet, a status that the nation achieved and maintained without engaging in campaigns of military conquest. China’s ability to amass and maintain a vast empire without military conquest is a significant source of pride for the Chinese people and is an integral component of China’s national mythology – whether completely accurate or not. (1)
2. China does not consider itself a ‘rising power;’ it believes that it is a ‘returning power,‘ reclaiming the respect and influence it enjoyed in Asia for two thousand years. Lee Kuan Yew, longtime president of Singapore and a careful observer of China, stated that China’s number one priority is to “recover its lost greatness.” (2).
3. As a land-based power surrounded by powerful states, with more than 13,000 miles of indefensible borders, China’s greatest strategic fear has been and remains that of being encircled by powerful enemies. Today, China is surrounded by potential adversaries: Russia to the north, Japan and South Korea to the east, Vietnam and India to the south, and Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines nearby. In Henry Kissinger’s description, “This is not a constellation conducive to conquest. It is more likely to raise fears of encirclement.” (3)
4. A second strategic priority for China is resisting foreign efforts to foment internal discontent.
5. A third strategic imperative is the desire to reclaim China’s historical sphere of influence, including the nearshore waters of the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. This concern has drawn China into armed confrontations with states that have competing claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea and with the United States (1954, 1958, 1995-1996). China’s claimed historical right to islands in the South China Sea is one of the primary sources of tension in the region today.
6. Historically, China has preferred to use war as part of a comprehensive political effort to shape the strategic environment that includes diplomacy, economics, and other elements of national power. They do not distinguish between war and diplomacy. They use war as a means of gaining an advantage in future relations, rather than as a means to resolve issues. They are extremely wary of prolonged wars of attrition, and prefer to strike quick, sharp blows for maximum psychological effect and then withdraw militarily, even if their operational and tactical objectives have not been achieved. They are not afraid of stalemates and they are adept at keeping conflicts simmering at a low level to psychologically exhaust their opponents. (4)
7. China’s rich and extensive history is the foundation of Chinese national security policies. Historically, China’s military has been used almost exclusively to secure the nation’s borders, repel invaders, maintain internal order, and protect the ruling government.

Notes:

(1) – Kissinger, Henry; The Future of U.S. – China Relations; Foreign Affairs Magazine; March/April 2012;  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-03-01/future-us-chinese-relations, Retrieved 8.15.2018.

(2)- Allison, Graham; Destined for War; Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; Boston – New York; 2017; page 107.

(3)  – Kissinger, (March/April 2012)

(4) – Li, Xiaobing, editor; China at War: An Encyclopedia; ABC-CLIO; Santa Barbara, CA; 2012; page xvii.

August 29, 2018